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It is my aim in this lecture* to discuss briefly three distinct, but connected 
problems.
First of all I shall deal with the way in which knowledge of Kierkegaard 
has spread in the present century.
Then I shall discuss the way Kierkegaard research has developed .
Finally, and most important, I shall deal with problems of the role Kierke­
gaard has played in twentieth century philosophy and theology. To illustrate 
this last problem I shall take as examples four important and influential 
philosophers and theologians.
Obviously in a short lecture like this there can be no question of going into 
detail. Only typical features can be mentioned.
I The spread of knowledge about Kierkegaard
Thanks to Hans Christian Andersen and Kierkegaard Danish is a world 
language, just as Greek and Latin were once and English is now.
Unfortunately this world language is only spoken and read by a small 
number of people, and of these only a minority uses it correctly. In order 
therefore to make oneself at all understood as a Dane, both at home and out 
in the wide world, it is necessary to employ various auxiliary languages.
Only a few years after Kierkegaards death the first translations of in­
dividual works of his appeared in Swedish and in the 1880’s the German 
translations began to appear. In the period around the First World War a 
more or less complete translation of Kierkegaard’s collected works came out 
(Vols 1-12, 1909-22, Himmelstrup’s Bibliography No 941). It was not a 
good translation, on the contrary. It was tendentious and faulty. In spite of 
this it was of considerable importance for the young philosophical rebels of
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that time, that is, for the men who were the most important and influential 
for a whole generation of theologians and philosophers. Here I shall not 
answer the question whether they led astray more than they acted as guides; 
but philosophers like Heidegger and Jaspers and theologians like Barth and 
Bultmann did not remain unknown. Subsequently more accurate German 
translations of his works and papers have come out.
In the French-speaking world the translation of Kierkegaard was slower. 
Most frequently use was made of the older German translation mentioned 
above. Jean Wahl and Pierre Mesnard for example used it for their major 
accounts of Kierkegaard’s thought and Jean-Paul Sartre used it too. French 
translations of individual works appeared before the Second World War but 
it is only in our own day that a complete edition is being prepared. Oddly 
enough one of Kierkegaard’s earliest works. “The Concept of Irony” did 
not come out in a French translation until 1975. It first came out in English 
at the beginning of the 1960’s.
In the English-speaking world it was different. The pioneers were the 
American professors of philosophy Hollander and Swenson. The latter in 
particular earned much gratitude by translating Kierkegaard’s “Philosophical 
Fragments”. It gives food for thought that while in Kierkegaard’s lifetime 
only a few hundred copies were sold of this work which came out in 1844 in 
the small town of Copenhagen in the small country of Denmark, more than 
43.000 copies have now been sold of Swenson’s translation as revised by 
Hong. More than anyone else however it was Dr. Walter Lowrie, an American 
clergyman, who after many years of working in Rome, where he wrote large 
books on church archaeology and liturgical subjects, returned to Princeton 
at the age of 65. He then began to learn Danish, from his butler among other 
people, and he translated the major part of Kierkegaard’s works at an im­
pressive speed, while Alexander Dru translated a rich selection of Kierke­
gaard’s journals.
These translations were widely disseminated and their influence can be 
seen everywhere in the English-language literature on Kierkegaard and in 
a variety of theological, philosophical and literary works in the period from 
the beginning of the Second World War to our own time.
Meritorious as these translations are it is equally certain that the time has 
now come to revise them or actually to make a new translation of Kierke­
gaard’s works. A complete edition of Kierkegaard’s works, with introductions,
notes etc is being prepared and will be published in 26 volumes. Howard 
Hong, who has now completed his major translation of Kierkegaard's “Jour­
nals and Papers” is the leading figure in this major project, which can be 
expected to be ready in the course of the next ten years.
II The Study of Kierkegaard
In the different language areas the study of Kierkegaard has developed in 
rather different ways.
In the Scandinavian countries people were for a long time, in my opinion 
for far too long, concerned with Kierkegaard the individual, the man behind 
the works, not the author in the work as a whole. Biographical and psycho­
logical studies flourished. Kierkegaard himself was not without blame for this. 
Probably under the influence of certain Romantic poets he strove to make 
himself interesting and enigmatic not only to himself but also to the public, 
although the external events of his life were few and commonplace. The 
really interesting thing was not these external facts and events, namely an 
elderly and old-fashioned father, a fanatical elder brother, a charming young 
girl, a conservative bishop and an impudent journalist. Such commonplace 
circumstances have been encountered by many other people than Kierkegaard 
in their lives. The really interesting thing is how much Kierkegaard was able 
as writer and thinker to get out of so little. We have the result in Kierke­
gaard's literary works, his authorship, as he himself called it.
This came to the fore after the Second World War. It was then that the 
philosophical and theological interest in and involvement with Kierkegaard's 
ideas began on a serious scale. For a number of years the monographs became 
fewer. Instead shorter specialist studies appeared in increasing numbers.
In Germany things were different. Almost every self-respecting philosopher 
or theologian had to concern himself with Kierkegaard and express his 
opinion about him.
It was the same for a period in Japan, where there is a whole literature on 
Kierkegaard (in addition to many different translations) -  a world of its own.
In the English-speaking world the study of Kierkegaard developed dif­
ferently in England and Canada on the one hand and in the USA on the other.
In the USA a large number of contributions to Kierkegaard scholarship 
have appeared. There are hundreds of theses and a quantity of books -  dif­
fering widely in standpoint and quality. By far the largest number of these 
are based on Lowries translations. In the last dozen years there has been an 
increasing realization of the need to learn Danish if one wishes to study 
Kierkegaard seriously. The most striking thing about this realization in my 
view is that it has come so late. No one would dream of studying Shakespeare 
without knowing English or studying Goethe without knowing German.
The most recent American books on Kierkegaard have for the most part 
been written by scholars who have taken the necessary trouble to learn 
Danish. Even such strongly critical books as those of Louis Mackey and Josiah 
Thompson bear witness to their author’s efforts to learn Kierkegaard’s mother 
tongue. More successful books are Paul Sponheim’s and Mark Taylor’s among 
others.
In England T. H. Croxall, who lived for a time in Denmark, was an en­
thusiastic pioneer. He was also one of the few who as well as understanding 
Kierkegaard also understood music. J. Heywood Thomas as theologian and 
Ronald Grimsley as historian of literature have earned much gratitude with 
their painstaking and well-informed studies.
It is however my general impression that as a whole there has been more 
reserve towards Kierkegaard in England than in America. I shall not attempt 
to explain the reason for this as I do not know it.
Today the study of Kierkegaard is international and it is developing in the 
form of close cooperation between experts from many countries and with 
very varied backgrounds.
Ill Kierkegaard’s Socratic Role for Twentieth Century Philosophy and 
Theology
Kierkegaard did not have much respect for the most famous names of the 
past philosophy and theology. Socrates and Descartes, Lessing and Hamann 
found favour in his eyes. Luther he ended up criticising severely and of later 
dogmatic theologians he had only a certain respect for Schleiermacher.
Kierkegaard’s posterity has had more respect for him. Kierkegaard has 
been studied and he has inspired and influenced many theologians and 
philosophers in this century. He has been a new Socrates; but just as Socrates 
did not only have his greatest discipel, Plato, who abandoned existential 
thinking to become a speculative philosopher, so has Kierkegaard had more
than one Plato this century who has “gone beyond”, but he has also had more 
than one Xenophon.
If, following the Swedish Kierkegaard scholar Valter Lindstrom and in 
any case greatly simplifying, we say that the first part of Kierkegaard’s author­
ship deals with how the individual person becomes a Christian (“The theology 
of the stages”) and the second part deals with how a person lives as a Christian 
(“The theology of imitation”), it can be stated without further ado that these 
Kierkegaardian problems are almost totally foreign to twentieth century 
philosophers and theologians.
The philosophers, in particular the German and French philosophers of 
existence, have asked, and answered, the question of how man becomes man, 
i.e. how man understood as an autonomous being can realize his possibilities.
The theologians have to a great extent been absorbed in the traditional 
subjects, exegesis and dogmatics, although they have undeniably often been 
so in an untraditional way.
Martin Heidegger, who like Wittgenstein was born in 1889, was as a young 
man interested in religion and entered the Jesuit order as a novice. For a few 
terms he studied Catholic theology at the University of Freiburg, but felt 
increasingly attracted by purely philosophical questions. His later philosoph­
ical works show that his acquaintance with theology and medieval Christian 
philosophy had a lasting influence and left deep and permanent traces in his 
own philosophy. In 1914 Heidegger submitted his doctoral thesis, “The 
theory of judgment in psychologism” (“Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologis- 
mus”). This work is strongly influenced by Husserls criticism of the psycho- 
logising tendencies in contemporary formal logic. Here Heidegger already 
shows his characteristic style by calling psychologism an “unphilosophy” 
(Unphilosophie). A year later, in 1915, he qualified to teach philosophy at 
a university with the still well-known work on “Duns Scotus’ Doctrine of 
Categories and Meanings”, which he dedicated to the neo-Kantian Heinrich 
Rickert (1863-1936). Duns Scotus, Immanuel Kant, Franz Brentano (1838- 
1917) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) are Heidegger’s main teachers; but 
he was not satisfied with them. In 1917 he was passed over for an appoint­
ment and for the next 5 years worked as leader of Husserl’s philosophical 
seminar. In 1923 he became a professor in Marburg, and in 1928, the year 
after the publication of his most famous work “Sein und Zeit” (Being and 
Time), he returned to Freiburg to succeed Husserl. Heidegger’s further career
and fate will not be discussed here; but the relation of his major work to 
Kierkegaard will be dealt with in a little more detail.
In “Being and Time”, which remainded uncompleted, Kierkegaard is men­
tioned both with approval and with criticism altogether three times.
It is characteristic that Heidegger has greatest approval for “The Concept 
of Anxiety”, which was written as a parody of a speculative philosophical 
textbook of the middle of the nineteenth century.
That Heidegger only mentions Kierkegaard directly in these three places 
is not conclusive. Without any doubt Kierkegaard acted as a major inspiration 
for the whole of Heidegger’s work.
It is Heidegger’s aim in “Being and Time” to develop a dynamic ontology 
as the basis for a corresponding fundamental ontology. His point of departure 
is the everyday understanding of existence. His purpose is to give an onto­
logical or so-called existential description of the specific character of human 
existence, in accordance with which he claims that all understanding of being 
must be deduced from the understanding of the human form of being, 
existence (Existenz) and its essential constituents.
The method Heidegger employs in “Being and Time” is Husserl’s pheno­
menological method. In his analysis of man’s form of being, existence, 
Heidegger everywhere uses a threefold structure, namely 1) freedom, 
2) facticity (i.e. the unavoidable conditions of life), and 3) the degree of con­
sciousness and energy with which man asserts his freedom in the face of his 
actual circumstances. The first two moments, freedom and facticity constitute 
the structure of human being (its “Seinsverfassung”), while the third moment 
constitutes the mode of this structure of being (its “Seinsart”).
Negatively Heidegger dissociates himself radically and everywhere from 
all traditional metaphysics and theology on the one hand and from all 
branches of science, both natural science and the humanistic disciplines on 
the other.
Heidegger claims that his whole work is a neutral phenomenological 
analysis, the results of which have universal validity. He provides no proof, 
however, for this claim and it is therefore understandable that a philosopher 
like Gilbert Ryle (in an article in “Mind”, 1929, pp 355-70) has dismissed 
the whole work as nebulous, mythological discourse.
This discourse is however expressed in a direct, didactic, authoritative form. 
It will be remembered that Kierkegaard had no interest in constructing an
ontology, that he did not employ a phenomenological method, that he did 
not use the same structure in his various works that he never taught directly 
and that he never spoke with authority.
It is thus easy to see the differences between Kierkegaard and Heidegger; 
but there are also similarities. We need only mention their common rejection 
of metaphysics on the one hand and of science on the other.
If we ignore what for Heidegger is the essential, namely his aim, method, 
scheme and direct form of communication, and only consider the actual con­
tent of “Being and Time”, the fundamental characteristics of human being 
in time, the Existentialia, it is not difficult to see that he has actually done 
nothing other than isolate the purely formal, natural, non-theological side of 
Kierkegaard’s thought, in particular from the “Concept of Anxiety” and the 
“Concluding Unscientific Postscript”. This is the side that is expressed in the 
proposition “subjectivity is truth”, while Heidegger completely leaves out the 
dialectical opposite, which for Kierkegaard is absolutely decisive, that 
“subjectivity is untruth“.
Where Heidegger abstracts, Kierkegaard concretizes, and he does so con­
sciously, with the intention namely of keeping himself and his reader to the 
given existence and the responsibility for it. For Kierkegaard every abstraction 
signifies a flight from reality to the uncommitted sphere of the intellect.
Kierkegaard only calls attention to the formal character of responsibility 
of existence in order to bring the individual to a single, decisive, concrete 
choice, namely: either to become a Christian or to admit his distance from 
Christianity. Heidegger on the contrary does not propose any concrete 
alternative, but will nevertheless deduce an imperative from his many 
indicatives.
Heidegger learned much from Kierkegaard, more than he himself admits. 
But he was not a good disciple of his Socrates in “Being and Time” and was 
even less so in his later philosophy where he went along his own almost im­
passable paths, ending up as a local poet of the Black Forest.
If we turn from Heidegger to his slightly older contemporary Karl Jaspers 
(born 1883) we enter a world which in many respects resembles Heidegger’s 
and in many respects differs from it.
Jaspers says himself that he started reading Kierkegaard in 1914 and that 
it was a revelation to him, quite different from the usual German academic 
philosophy (“Psychologie der Weltanschauungen” [Psychology of world
views], p. X). Jaspers himself had not studied philosophy as a subject at the 
university, but medicine. At the age of 30 he made his name with a huge work 
on “Allgemeine Psychopathologie” [General Psychopathology] (1913). 
Another bold work of youth followed only six years later, namely “Psycho­
logic der Weltanschauungen” [Psychology of World Views] (1919), 
where the inspiration of Kierkegaard is particularly evident. But with Jaspers 
the encouter with Kierkegaard had a more long-term effect than with Hei­
degger. In his old age Jaspers was still writing articles about Kierkegaard 
which were respectful of his genius but at the same time critical (see eg 
“Aneignung und Polemik” [Appropriation and Polemic], 1968).
Like Heidegger, Jaspers in his youth made extensive use of Husserl’s pheno­
menological method (see his Autobiography, German edition p. 12); but 
Kierkegaard put him on the right road. Jaspers just did not keep to it.
Jaspers himself calls his three-volume work which came out in 1931 with 
the title “Philosophic” [Philosophy] his favourite work. In the following 
I shall base myself on this since it achieves greater clarity than the 1919 work 
and the influence of Kierkegaard was still strong.
In this work Jaspers claims that as I awaken to consciousness of myself 
I discover that I am in a world, in which I orientate myself. I have had things 
in my grasp and dropped them again. They were simply there. But now I 
respond with wonder and ask what really is, for everything in this world is 
transitory. I was not there at the beginning and will not be there at the end, 
but I ask about both. To this question I want an answer which will give me 
rest since in the awareness of my situation which I neither fully understand 
nor see through in its origin, I am oppressed by a vague anxiety. I seek a 
being which does not pass away, eternal being.
For Jaspers however, wonder, or anxiety and despair are not the only 
possible points of departure for philosophical thought. Doubt can also be 
a point of departure. Jaspers points furthermore to a fourth point of departure, 
to which he attributes very great importance, namely the need to reach other 
people, the need for deep inter-personal relationships, an “existential com­
munication”.
We must not, Jaspers claims, take refuge in “seductive metaphysics”. Nor 
must we settle down in the certainty of science. To the question about eternal 
being there is, however, according to Jaspers, no answer in the ordinary sense. 
Eternal being cannot be made an object for my consciousness. What I can
become conscious of in my situation is that I am a subject confronting a world 
of objects. Eternal being is not outside, but within me. This is Platonic 
discourse.
Jaspers* “Philosophie” [Philosophy] is divided into three parts, namely 
“world-orientation”, “illumination of existence” and “metaphysics’*. The 
subjects of these three parts are the world, existence and transcendence re­
spectively. To the two latter correspond in mythology, according to Jaspers, 
the soul and God.
That “world-orientation” comes first is natural. What I am immediately 
confronted with is what collectively constitutes the world.
Jaspers speaks of two kinds of world-orientation namely the scientific and 
the philosophical, which supplement each other. Thus Jaspers does not reject 
science like Heidegger. Scientific world-orientation provides objective 
knowledge and thus frees me from subjective prejudices and limitations.
Science however can give no information about the being which does not 
manifest itself in a generally compelling way as an object for consciousness. 
Here the philosophical world-orientation comes in and opens us to the totality 
of being, what Jaspers calls “the encompassing” (das Umgreifende), which 
both appears to us and is in us, and which reaches out over all horizons. The 
philosophical world-orientation will also show the contradictions, gulfs and 
limitations we encounter when we try to understand the world as a whole.
Jaspers* analyses lead to a critique of positivist thought, but this is at the 
same time a critique of philosophical idealism which makes the ego as spirit 
absolute, while the world becomes secondary. In Jaspers* view neither the ego 
nor the world can be regarded as absolute, but from this it follows, he goes 
on, that “I am floating in a bottomless space”.
What then am I to do in this situation?
Jaspers replies that there are two alternatives. The one is to go back to 
authority and revelation, the other to go forward to philosophical independ­
ence. Jaspers himself can only take the latter course. Kierkegaard chose the 
former.
Having set out on the road to philosophical independence Jaspers proceeds 
to carry out his “illumination of existence”. Like Kierkegaard he reserves the 
use of the word “existence” for discussion of man’s being. Being in general 
merely means being present in the world and this being can be studied by 
science. Existence on the other hand cannot be made an object for conscious­
ness. Illumination of existence is self-knowledge, introspection, that is, it is 
what Kierkegaard called the highest that could be attained within the human 
sphere, immanence, where subjectivity is truth, as it was for Socrates. Here 
inner action is as much involved as thought in the normal sense. Man 
actualizes himself in illumination of existence.
The result, in short, is that in the first place I become conscious of having 
an historical existence, which involves originality in the eternal. Secondly the 
ego becomes conscious of its freedom, this act of becoming conscious taking 
place in the choice, the decision that the ego will become itself. Thirdly 
illumination of existence results in communication, which means both self- 
abandonment and self-assertion.
This, however, is not the end of the egos search for eternal being. The ego 
reaches beyond itself. Existence is not sufficient to itself.
Jaspers aims to show this in the third part of “Philosophie”, i.e. in meta­
physics. Real being, eternal being comes to me from the unconditioned, 
transcendence as Jaspers calls it, or God, as the theologians say.
Jaspers emphasizes that it is not possible to construct any adequate doctrine 
of God on the same lines as theories about things in the world. A genuine 
theology, a doctrine of God, would according to Jaspers presuppose that God 
was in the world as an object for consciousness. For Jaspers God only appears 
to us through our existence. If we try to say anything about God the state­
ments we make will only point beyond die normal meaning of the words 
and will then be what Jaspers calls “ciphers” or symbols.
The attitude of the philosopher, as Jaspers claims in a later work, will be 
an openness toward the unknowable transcendence, a philosophical faith 
with no specific content.
That Jaspers was inspired by Kierkegaard in his analysis of existence is 
clear enough. But it is equally clear that he has a different point of departure, 
a different method and a different goal from Kierkegaard. Just as Plato went 
beyond Socrates and constructed a metaphysics, so Jaspers went beyond 
Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard chose Christian faith, Jaspers preferred philo­
sophical faith. Expressed in another way, Kierkegaard chose the leap; Jaspers 
stayed put.
If we go from the two German philosophers Heidegger and Jaspers, of 
whom particularly the former has had an influence on continental theology
for almost half a century which it is still not easy to survey, to the theologians, 
it will be most natural to discuss the young Barth and the young Bultmann 
as inspired by Kierkegaard.
Karl Barth (born 1886) belonged all his life to the Reformed (Calvinist) 
Church. As a student he was influenced in particular by the Ritschlian, Wil­
helm Hermann. In his early years Barth was a country pastor in Switzerland, 
and from 1921-35 he was a professor at various German universities, in the 
last part of the period at Bonn. But in 1935 he had to leave Germany for 
political reasons and was at Basle until 1962.
The young Karl Barth’s first edition (of 1919) of his commentary on Saint 
Paul’s epistle to the Romans caused a certain stir but only three years later, 
in 1922, it was followed by a new revised edition. The preface to this is 
rightly regarded as the manifesto of dialectical theology.
Karl Barth wrote his commentary on Romans while he was a country 
pastor. Bultmann, whom I shall discuss shortly, was a university theologian 
all his life, and primarily a scholar, not a preacher, which Barth really re­
mained all his life.
Barth did not turn his attention to St Paul for historical reasons, but in 
order to speak to his own contemporaries about the same thing that St Paul had 
written his epistle about. Barth’s commentary on Romans was to be theology 
in the genuine sense, talk about God.
That was the immediate difficulty for Barth. He discovered, under the 
direct inspiration of Kierkegaard, that St Paul taught an “infinite, qualitative 
difference between time and eternity, between man and God”.
According to Barth the gulf between God and man is not removed but 
accentuated in St Paul’s talk of God’s revelation. In this talk, in this proclama­
tion, it is not said that the revelation in Christ opens a new way and gives 
a kind of spiritual supplement to man’s ethical or religious endeavours. On 
the contrary, Barth claims that for St Paul revelation means a sovereign act 
on the part of God, an act which does not make God an object of human 
knowledge but rather enables man to be an object for what God wills.
What Barth sought to proclaim in his commentary on Romans was inspired 
by certain ideas of Kierkegeaard; but Barth tore them right out of their con­
text in Kierkegaard and took them far further than Kierkegaard had intended.
Barth wanted to show once again that the impossible had proved possible and 
that everything which was purely human, everything without exception, was 
judged and condemned, and not least man's religion.
Where Kierkegaard had a well-considered theology of the stages followed 
by a theology of imitation, the young Barth had only a “neither-nor”.
Barth got no further than this in the 1920’s. In the draft “Christliche 
Dogmatik” (Christian Dogmatics) of 1927 the inspiration from Kierkegaard 
can still be seen. It disappeared however and did not return. In his very 
individual account of the history of theology in the nineteenth century, Barth 
does not discuss Kierkegaard in a chapter to himself but only here and there 
in passing.
It is odd that in the last volume (IV, 4) of his monumental “Church 
Dogmatics”, which he began publishing in 1932 and which ended, un­
completed, in 1967, Barth does not mention Kierkegaard at all, although 
there are clear points of similarity between Barth’s critique of child baptism 
and Kierkegaard’s.
While Kierkegaard assumed that Christian dogmatics was known and 
accepted, Barth formulated a completely new dogmatics which at nearly every 
point was sharply critical not only of the dogmatics of theological liberalism, 
or only of Schleiermacher, but also of orthodox dogmatics and that of the 
Reformers.
While Barth simply had contempt for philosophy as a whole and only had 
a very fragmentary knowledge of it, Bultmann was in this as well as in 
other respects quite different from Barth.
In Bultmann’s (1884—) thought a whole series of factors are combined. As 
New Testament exegete he had a perfect command of the philological and 
historical method and in his earliest works, at the beginning of the 1920’s, 
put forward theories which were more radical than those of any liberal 
theologian. As a systematic theologian he was influenced by such different 
men as Wilhelm Hermann and Karl Barth. A strong influence from the 
German Luther renaissance is evident and then there is the inspiration from 
Kierkegaard.
There is still more to be said however, namely that a strong dependence 
on Neo-Kantianism, which in Bultmann’s student years was so to speak the
official German university philosophy, was combined in a quite irrational 
way with the views of the anti-Kantian Heidegger, as I have outlined them 
above. In his work of 1954 against Bultmann’s later theology, the so-called 
demythologizing, Jaspers criticises Bultmann with uncharacteristic severity 
for philosophical confusion and dilettantism, among other things because 
Bultmann had virtually rejected the New Testament in favour of Heidegger’s 
“Being and Time”, which for Bultmann was an infallible guide or rather the 
rigid frame within which all his thinking, including his account of New 
Testament theology, took place.
Bultmann scarcely ever discusses Kierkegaard directly in his many books 
and articles. The inspiration, however, in his early works is clear enough, 
although it is not always easy to determine whether it is mostly direct or 
indirect.
In opposition to the dominant liberal theology, Barth had strongly asserted, 
in his commentary on Romans, the objective aspect of Christianity, what it 
proclaims as truth. Barth did not entirely evade the question of appropriation, 
which was one of Kierkegaards main problems, the question of how 
Christianity becomes truth for the individual person. But in his early works 
he strove to formulate this “subjective” side of Christianity in such a way 
that Christianity was not reduced to subjectivism, psychologism or religious 
experience.
Bultmann agreed with Barth in this basic standpoint. He did not however 
agree with him about its formulation.
Bultmann’s dissatisfaction was expressed in a major review of Barth’s 
commentary on Romans (in the journal “Die christliche Welt” (The Christian 
World), 1922).
In this review the influence of Kierkegaard appears more clearly than is 
usually the case with Bultmann. There is therefore good reason to devote 
some attention to it.
Bultmann stresses three things, namely:
1. If Christian faith is to be personal, to be “mine”, it must represent a 
content of consciousness and not merely be an “empty space”, as Barth said. 
Faith means that a particular content is appropriated and determines man’s 
consciousness, whereupon faith is expressed in word and deed. As a subjective 
conviction and attitude faith has parallels in phenomena like love, trust and
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gratitude. These phenomena also determine a person's consciousness and are 
expressed in word and deed. This whole side of faith Barth almost completely 
ignored.
2. It is a theological task to discover what Christian faith as a subjective 
phenomenon means, i.e. what appropriation means. Bultmann remarks that 
it is of decisive importance to realize that appropriation does not mean “to 
think with assent” (cum assensu cogitare), as the followers of the orthodox 
theological thought. If appropriation is understood in this way, then, Bult­
mann claims, Christianity is reduced to a system of propositions and that 
would on the one hand reduce faith to submission to an external authority 
and on the other turn faith into an intellectual feat. Unlike orthodoxy, liberal 
theology made faith an experience, not of God but of the believer's own 
psychological state.
The question of how the truth and reality which Christianity proclaims 
can determine the individual personally, is the question of appropriation, 
which Barth did not answer satisfactorily but which Bultmann raised anew -  
inspired by Kierkegaard and probably also by Luther.
The Christian message meets the individual -  a Kierkegaardian category -  
as a personal address which requires a decision for or against. The message 
meets the individual in his individual existence.
3. The relationship between the Christian message and human existence 
can never, Bultmann goes on to claim in his criticism of Barth, be determined 
definitively by a formula. Each individual and each generation must start 
from the beginning. The meeting takes place in the instant -  again a Kierke­
gaardian category.
4. If neither the Christian message nor human existence can be fixed once 
and for all, the theologian and the preacher are not, as Barth held, bound to 
the New Testament forms of expression and the Biblical view of the world.
-  Here Bultmann laid the foundation for his later theology. The world- 
famous demythologizing programme, which he did not put forward until a 
dozen years later and which he himself regarded as an unbroken continuation 
of his early theories, was in fact outlined in the above review of Barth's 
commentary on Romans.
I hope that this very summary account of the importance the encounter 
with Kierkegaard had for four of the most influential philosophers and
theologians of this century has shown some of the most characteristic features.
Common to Heidegger and Barth is the fact that there is a marked 
difference between the works of their youth, which are wholly or partly 
inspired by Kierkegaard, and the works of their manhood -  which I have not 
discussed in detail -  where Kierkegaard slides right into the background or 
simply disappears. Heidegger was a philosopher, Barth was a theologian. 
Neither of them was both.
Common to Jaspers and Bultmann is the continuity in their authorships. 
Neither of them has subsequently neglected or dissociated himself from Kier­
kegaard; but both have developed a long way away from Kierkegaard.
Unlike these four, Kierkegaard himself spoke sometimes as a philosopher, 
sometimes as a theologian, sometimes as a psychologist, sometimes as an 
aesthetician, sometimes as a poet and sometimes as a polemicist against the 
Church.
On all four Kierkegaard acted as a disquieting Socrates; at a particular 
point in their development he gave them a decisive stimulus, not to become 
followers of Socrates, something none of them were or became, but to become 
themselves. Neither the individualist Heidegger, the all-embracing Jaspers, 
the great preacher and dogmatic system-builder Barth nor the philologist and 
prophet Bultmann became Kierkegaardians. In this they were undeniably 
faithful to the Kierkegaard who wanted no followers and disciples. Instead 
they became themselves.
All four went beyond Kierkegaard. Finally we can just raise the question 
whether they went forwards or backwards in relation to Kierkegaard. My own 
answer to this question I need scarcely state.
